Korsgaard argued that hanging everything on rational choice was a red herring, however, because humans, even for Kant, are not solely rational beings.
The big difference, they argue, is sentience. Many animals have it; zygotes and embryos dont. Colb and Dorf define sentience as the ability to have subjective experiences, which is a little tricky, because animal subjectivity is whats hard for us to pin down.
The problem with torturing a robot, in other words, has nothing to do with what a robot is, and everything to do with what we fear most in ourselves.
A famous paper called What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, by the philosopher Thomas Nagel, points out that even if humans were to start flying, eating bugs, and getting around by sonar they would not have a bats full experience, or the batty subjectivity that the creature had developed from birth.
Darling, trying to account for this behavior, suggests that our aversion to abusing lifelike machines comes from societal values. While the rational part of our mind knows that a Pleo is nothing but circuits, gears, and softwarea machine that can be switched off, like a coffeemakerour sympathetic impulses are fooled, and, because theyre fooled, to beat the robot is to train them toward misconduct.
Quarrels come at boundary points. Should we consider it immoral to swat a mosquito? If these insects dont deserve moral consideration, whats the crucial quality they lack?
讀完：February 22, 2018 at 02:12PM｜來源：URL