More traditional rationalist models suggest that moral judgments arise from deliberative reflection and the careful weighing of reasons. These models have fallen out of fashion in recent years, and it has become increasingly popular to think that moral judgments are instead shaped by our "moral intuitions" -- fast and often emotionally-charged responses to morally salient situations that are produced by unconscious cognitive processes and mechanisms.

Sauer's goal is to defend rationalism by demonstrating that, properly understood, it is perfectly consistent with this growing body of empirical research.

but also that we have good empirical reasons to believe that automatic and intuitive responses to morally salient situations are themselves shaped by deliberative reflection and the careful weighing of reasons.

The basic move in this part of his defense is to try to demonstrate that deliberative reflection and the careful weighing of reasons play a significant role in the formation, maintenance, and correction of our moral intuitions, so that the fact that moral intuitions play a significant role in moral judgment is perfectly consistent with the view that moral judgments arise from deliberative reflection and the careful weighing of reasons.

I want to suggest here that Sauer has not yet made the case that moral intuitions can be educated.

The problem, then, is this. What Sauer needs in order to be able to reconcile rationalism with empirical evidence is evidence that deliberative reflection and the careful weighing of reasons shapes our automatic and intuitive responses to morally salient situations, not just that our automatic and intuitive responses to morally salient situations sometimes give way to deliberative reflection and the careful weighing of reasons.

The problem for Sauer is that the idea that we can unlearn implicit biases remains rather controversial. In fact, the current consensus seems to be that interventional strategies produce only short-term effects; various interventions immediately reduce implicit preferences, but this effect goes away after a couple of days, something that suggests that implicit preferences are actually rather steadfast (Lai et al. 2016).

讀完:March 23, 2018 at 02:34AM|來源:URL